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Since colonial times, the people of Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast have 
developed a distinctive cultural and ethnic heritage that has evolved separately 
and often contrary to that of the Hispanic civilization to the west. Within 
a region comprising nearly two‑thirds of Nicaragua’s national territory, 
a diverse population of approximately 120,000 Indians and Creoles has 
successfully resisted repeated attempts by the state to assimilate them into the 
cultural mainstream. As a result of their geographic isolation from the Spanish 
conquest and their proximity to the Caribbean, the aboriginal population of 
the Atlantic Coast came into extensive contact with British traders as well as 
a small number of African slaves whose English language, social customs, and 
ethnic stock both contributed to the rise of the Miskito1, Sumu, Rama, and 
Creole peoples. This emergence of new local identities also coincided with 
the establishment of independent cultural and political structures. Likewise, 
the regional adaptation of Moravian religiosity and North American capitalist 
tendencies served to further differentiate the Costeños from Mestizo society.2 
Consequently, the inhabitants of the Atlantic Coast came to regard the 
Nicaraguan state as an intrusive foreign entity that at times sought to impose 
its authority and Hispanic culture over the region.
For the most part, the indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast enjoyed 
a sense of political and cultural autonomy not experienced by other ethnic 
1 Over the centuries, there has been a number of different spellings for the term Miskito 
(i.e.  Mosquito, Musquito, Miskitu etc.), referring to a specific indigenous tribe on Nicaragua’s 
Atlantic Coast. 
2 Charles R Hale, Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 
 1894–1987. (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1994): 12–13.
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minorities in the western half of Nicaragua. Nevertheless, with the successful 
overthrow of the 43‑year Somoza regime by the Frente Sandinista Liberación 
Nacional (FSLN) on 17 July 1979, the new Sandinista government attempted 
to implement a program of national liberation (with a “we know what’s best for 
them attitude”) that would inevitably come into direct conflict with pre‑existing 
social, political and economic formations in the region.3 The FSLN had set 
out to redress centuries of what they perceived as imperialist exploitation and 
racist discrimination in an attempt to create a more egalitarian society in which 
disparities of wealth and opportunities would be eliminated. However, in their 
effort to bring the revolution to the Atlantic Coast, the Sandinistas displayed 
little regard for ethnic and cultural sensibilities that had been essential to the 
longevity of Coast society. Consequently, the Costeños reacted to state initiatives 
with increasingly pronounced displays of defiance. Over time, the growing 
militancy of the indigenous opposition combined with the perceived threat of 
a U.S.‑backed foreign invasion from across the Honduran border prompted the 
Sandinista government to respond to acts of civil disobedience with increasing 
oppression and violence. As a result, large segments of the Coast population 
that had been passively resistant toward the revolutionary process soon found 
themselves engaged militarily against it.
Over the course of this paper, I will carefully illustrate how Sandinista 
programs of cultural assistance and social reconstruction that were intended 
to benefit the peoples of the Atlantic Coast had actually served to alienate large 
segments of the indigenous population. Likewise, I will show how the apparent 
ignorance of the Sandinistas in regard to their understanding of indigenous 
social and political formations, that had resulted from centuries of contact with 
British and North American enterprises, produced high levels of indifference 
among the Coast communities toward the revolutionary process. As a result, 
I will demonstrate how increasingly repressive responses on the part of the San‑
dinista government toward popular dissension helped to transform the fun‑
damental character of the indigenous opposition from one of political apathy 
to that of armed resistance. 
The Emergence of Indigenous Societies 
on the Atlantic Coast
Since the arrival of the Spanish, the indigenous inhabitants of Central 
America have struggled to preserve their traditions in the face of advancing 
Hispanic culture and political rule. During the 16th century, many of the native 
Indian tribes who migrated southward from Mesoamerica to the Nicaraguan 
3 Ibidem, 6–7, 12.
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west coast were enslaved at the hands of the Spanish either to be sent as 
labourers to the silver mines of South America or to be put to work upon local 
plantations producing foodstuffs in support of colonial enterprises elsewhere 
(Bartolomé de las Casas, Bishop of Chiapas (1545), defended Indian rights 
in opposition to colonial policies).4 Over a short period of time, the Indian 
population had been decimated by poor working conditions and disease.5 
As a result of prolonged coexistence between the Spaniards and the Indians, 
a new racially mixed Mestizo society emerged within the context of a dominant 
Hispanic culture. Yet while the Spanish language, religion, and social customs 
pervaded the Pacific region of what would become Nicaragua, the Spanish 
failed to establish the same direct influence and control over a geographically 
isolated region known as the Atlantic Coast. Mountains, swamps, and jungles 
had hindered expansion eastward by the Spanish, leaving the region only 
accessible from the Caribbean. Therefore, it was Great Britain that was able 
to establish its influence over the region through a commercial relationship that 
proved mutually beneficial to both the British and those Coastal tribes that had 
migrated north from the Amazon basin.6
In 1633, British traders from the nearby Providence Island settlement 
established commercial relations with members of the Bawiksas tribe on the 
Atlantic Coast. The Indians traded meat and fish in exchange for metal tools and 
highly sought after manufactured goods. However, when the British colony was 
destroyed during a Spanish naval bombardment in 1641, many of the surviving 
colonists chose to resettle on the Atlantic Coast, eventually integrating into the 
local Indian communities. Over time, the racially mixed descendants of these 
communities coalesced into what would become the Miskito nation, with its own 
distinctive language and culture.7 The Miskitos were receptive toward the British 
commercial presence in the region, often joining privateers in raids upon Spanish 
settlements. In addition, the Miskitos became intermediaries for the British 
in trading with other tribes further inland. As a result, the British rewarded the 
Miskitos with firearms that not only enabled them to resist Spanish political 
4 Bartolomé de las Casas, The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account. (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992), 53–57.
5 Gillian Brown, “Miskito Revindication: Between Revolution and Resistance,” in Nicaragua: 
A Revolution under Siege, ed., Richard L. Harris (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1986): 175; John‑Paul 
Wilson, “Church, State, and Society during the Nicaraguan Revolution,” Diálogos Latinoamericanos 
16, (Fall 2009): 117, Fall 2009, Casas, Devastation of the Indies, 53–57.
6 Carlos M. Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity in Nicaragua: Capitalist Modernization and Revolu‑
tionary Change on the Atlantic Coast (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987):  13–16; 
Philip A. Dennis, “The Costeños and the Revolution in Nicaragua,” Journal of Interamerican  Studies 
and World Affairs 23–3 (1981): 274.
7 Brown, “Miskito Revindication,” 178; Karl Bermann, “Big Stick: Nicaragua and the United 
States, 1848–1984,” in The Miskito Question and the Revolution in Nicaragua ed. Judy Tazewell 
(Hampton, VA: Compita Publishing, 1984): 2.
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penetration into the region, but also to expand their own territory at the expense 
of the weaker aboriginal tribes. By 1687, the British had established a protectorate 
over the region under the auspices of Miskito Kingdom. For generations 
to come, Miskito kings were to be recognized and commissioned by a British 
superintendent, who governed through a system of indirect administration.8 
Nevertheless, the Miskitos embraced their political ties to Great Britain, not as 
subjects to the British crown but rather as partners of a lucrative trade.
With their relationship to the British deepening, the Miskito Kingdom 
came into greater contact with the British Caribbean colonies. As plantains, 
bananas, and sugarcane began to be cultivated, slave labourers from Jamaica and 
the Cayman Islands were imported to work the plantations along the Atlantic 
Coast. Although many of these immigrants would form the basis of a separate 
black, English‑speaking community, some chose to take Miskito wives, whose 
children were subsequently accepted into the Miskito tribe. Further adding to the 
ethnic diversity of the region were small numbers of Sumu and Rama Indians, 
who had fallen under Miskito rule yet had avoided miscegenation. For nearly 
a century, the Sumu, Rama, and Creole populations lived in relative harmony 
among the Miskito majority, some even holding office within the administration.9 
Nevertheless, as a condition of the Convention of London in 1787, Great 
Britain was forced to relinquish its control over the Miskito Kingdom to Spain 
in exchange for exclusive lumbering rights in Belize. Even though the British 
were to remain in close contact with the Miskito king, their influence had been 
severely diminished as a result of their departure. Interestingly enough, the 
Spanish never renewed their attempt to colonize the region, effectively endorsing 
the local authority of the Miskito king.10
By the early 19th century, the Miskitos had entered into a profitable contra‑
band trade in mahogany with the Spanish residing to the west. This exchange 
precipitated the rise of port centres, such as Bluefields and Greytown (San Juan 
de la Norte) that facilitated the transit of valuable goods westward along the 
major river‑ways. The prosperity of the trade soon attracted independent British 
loggers back to the Miskito Kingdom as the result of the exhaustion of maho‑
gany in Belize. Nevertheless, with the declaration of Central American indepen‑
dence  in 1821, trading with the Spanish came to an abrupt end. And with the 
departure of Spain from the region, the British sought to revive its influence over 
the Coast by re‑establishing its protectorate.11
8 Dennis, “Costeños and Revolution,” 276; Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 17–19.
9 Michael D Olien, “Imperialism, Ethnogenesis and Marginality: Ethnicity and Politics on the 
Mosquito Coast, 1845–1964,” Journal of Ethnic Studies 16–1(1984): 2–7; Janusz Bugajski, Sandinista 
Communism and Rural Nicaragua (New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1990): 67.
10 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 20–21.
11 Ibidem, 21–23.
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At the behest of the British superintendent, missionaries representing the 
Moravian Church began to arrive to the Atlantic Coast in 1847. This entrance 
was perhaps one of the most important events to have taken place during this 
period in terms of its lasting impact upon Miskito society. With evangelization 
came the establishment of the first permanent institutions from which 
to provide health care and education to the people at large.12 More significantly, 
though, the Protestant faith became a new expression of ethnic identity on the 
Coast, with important features distinguishing it from the Catholic/Hispanic 
culture to the west. Moravian missions became the centre of village life, thereby 
providing Miskitos, Sumus, Ramas, and Creoles alike with a unifying force 
from which to transcend their own individual cultures. Likewise, the Moravian 
Church played a profound role in creating a new political consciousness 
among the Coast inhabitants. Although loyal to Great Britain, the missionaries, 
nonetheless, encouraged the population to assert their regional autonomy as 
a result of growing trepidation over the Nicaraguan state and its designs on the 
Miskito Kingdom. Henceforth, as literacy and religious observance increased, 
a widening distinction emerged between the Costeños and the “Spaniards” 
residing to the west.13
In 1849, the discovery of gold in California sparked interest in an inter‑oceanic 
route from east to west via Central America. The United States had long tolerated 
the presence of Great Britain on the Atlantic Coast; nevertheless, British influence 
had now come into direct competition with North American interests.14 Over the 
next decade, a series of treaties between the two countries gradually diminished 
the British presence on the Coast, placing more control of the Miskito Kingdom 
over to the Nicaraguan government. Most notable was the Clayton‑Bulwer Treaty 
(1850), guaranteeing equal access to the shipping channels at Greytown.15 Soon 
after, the Accessory Transit Company provided transportation through Greytown 
to Lake Nicaragua with an additional short rail to reach the Pacific Ocean.16 
Ultimately, the Treaty of Managua in 1860 effectively limited British jurisdiction 
to within the borders of Belize. The Nicaraguan state would encompass the 
territory that had been the Miskito Kingdom. However, the Miskitos were allowed 
to retain the customs and local authority they were accustomed to as a part of an 
autonomous reserve within the national boundaries.17
12 Dennis, “Costeños and Revolution,” 277.
13 Bugajski, Sandinista Communism, 66.
14 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 25–27.
15Armin Rappaport, A History of American Diplomacy, (New York: McMillan Publishing Co., 
1975): 141–142.
16 Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1933): 229.
17 Bernard Nietschmann, The Unknown War: The Miskito Nation, Nicaragua, and the United 
States. (London: Freedom House, 1990): 20–21.
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 Although the locus of power remained firmly in the hands of the Miskito 
king, an important evolution had been taking place within the ethnic hierarchy. 
Since the establishment of the Miskito Reserve in 1861, Bluefields had 
emerged as the financial centre of the region as well as the seat of government. 
A bicameral legislature had been established consisting of both general and 
executive councils to enact laws and appoint officials as well as to handle any 
number of fiscal or judicial matters as there might arise.18 As time went on, 
members of the Creole population achieved greater representation within these 
regional government bodies as a result of superior education and their growing 
commercial orientation. The Miskitos, on the other hand, found their numbers 
in government positions decreasing due to their greater illiteracy and their 
inability to speak fluent English. Eventually, the Miskito king came to preside 
over entire councils comprised of solely English‑speaking Creole members as 
the Miskitos were pushed further out of the civic mainstream. As a result, the 
political marginalization of Miskitos vastly accelerated the social differentiation 
between ethnic communities as the Creole population came to dominate the 
economic enterprises of the Atlantic Coast.19
By the late 19th century, the construction of an inter‑oceanic railroad (and later 
a canal) across the Isthmus of Panama greatly reduced the demand for trans‑
portation services in Greytown and Bluefields, prompting Costeños to revitalize 
the production of gold, rubber, and bananas as a means of obtaining wealth and 
 foreign goods. The resurrection of the plantations and mines soon attracted a new 
wave of migrant workers from both Jamaica and the American South. In addition, 
U.S. entrepreneurs began to invest in the operations in which Creole supervisors 
contracted large numbers of Miskitos as salaried workers to engage in extraction 
activities. As more raw materials and basic commodities came to be exported 
internationally, money and manufactured goods started to filter into villages and 
rural areas, transforming a primitive economy based on subsistence agriculture 
to one linked financially to the world market. Ultimately, western Nicaraguan 
authorities, witnessing such capital accumulation, were forced to reconsider their 
policy toward the Atlantic Coast.20
From the outset, relations between the Nicaraguan government and the Miskito 
Kingdom had been marked by mutual suspicion and mistrust. The  Costeños 
had been only too aware of the ethnocentric nature of the Nicaraguan state 
and had fought tenaciously to preserve their own cultural heritage and political 
economy through regional autonomy. However, in light of their recent economic 
18 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 31.
19 Olien, “Imperialism, Ethnogenesis,” 10–15.
20 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 27–30; John‑Paul Wilson, “Regional Confluence: Foreign 
Enterprise and Nicaraguan Costeño Society,” Globality Studies Journal, no. 38, (September 22, 
2013): http://globality.cc.stonybrook.edu/?p=960; Nietschmann, Unknown War, 21–22.
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prosperity, the state came to resent the special status that the Costeños enjoyed, 
viewing the Miskito Kingdom as an obstacle towards the development of 
a national infrastructure and a satisfactory foreign policy.21 Therefore, in 1894, 
President José Santos Zelaya of the ruling Liberal Party ordered a Nicaraguan 
expeditionary force to occupy the Atlantic Coast and remove the authority of 
the Miskito king under the pretence of curtailing an “unauthorized” foreign 
economic presence within national boundaries. The Miskito Kingdom was 
subsequently incorporated into the rest of Nicaragua as the Department of 
Zelaya, and over the next several decades, the government engaged in a campaign 
to “Hispanicise” the region by promoting Spanish as the official language of 
education and administration. In addition, large numbers of Mestizo peasants 
were encouraged to migrate to the sparsely populated region in an attempt to alter 
the ethnic balance.22 Ironically, it was President Zelaya who would encourage 
an unprecedented level of North American and European investment with the 
promise of tax incentives and economic autonomy, precipitating the growth of 
large‑scale multi‑national corporations on the Coast.23 Hence, the political and 
economic activities that had once been controlled by the local Miskito population 
were to be dominated by foreign nationals and new Mestizo migrants for the next 
70 years.24 This net demotion in status championed by the “Spaniards” would 
become a part of Costeño cultural memory.
The Nicaraguan government believed that the presence of multi‑national 
corporations within the Department of Zelaya could generate high levels of 
economic activity that would, in effect, improve the national economy, in which 
case, the state gave foreign companies virtually free reign to exploit the region’s 
minerals, forests, and wildlife in return for a substantial sum of the revenues. 
This relationship, nonetheless, proved to be a short‑term solution to complex 
problems associated with national development. Despite having employed large 
numbers of local Indians as unskilled labourers, companies reserved management 
and technical positions for Mestizos and foreign nationals at the exclusion of 
skilled and educated members of the Creole community.25 Likewise, companies 
made little attempt to advance local industry, instead preferring to import needed 
machinery and spare parts from abroad. Initially, Coast inhabitants enjoyed 
significant improvement in their standard of living as a result of decent wages 
and increased access to manufactured goods. However, the failure to reinvest 
into the local economic infrastructure ultimately sent the region into a state 
of decline.26 By the 1930’s Great Depression, the entire educational system and 
21 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 31–32.
22 Olien, “Imperialism, Ethnogenesis,” 21–22; Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 38–40.
23 Wilson, “Regional Confluence”.
24 Bugajski, Sandinista Communism, 66; Olien, “Imperialism, Ethnogenesis,” 17–18.
25 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 44–45.
26 Ibidem, 48; Dennis, “Costeños and Revolution,” 279.
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national infrastructure was on the verge of collapse. Roads and communications 
suffered from deterioration and neglect. And the region’s political institutions 
had become havens for graft and corruption. Yet, beyond token efforts to redress 
problems of unemployment and illiteracy, the state was completely unprepared 
to handle the crisis.27
The ascendance of Anastasio Somoza García to the presidency brought little 
in the way of immediate economic relief to the Atlantic Coast. In fact, the dictator 
outright abandoned the region as a hopeless backwater, instead concentrating 
his efforts within the western portion of the country. However, as a result of 
state neglect, the Coast inhabitants began to experience political and economic 
freedoms not to be found in the west.28 World War II marked the beginning of 
a gradual but often intermittent recovery of the region. During the Japanese 
occupation of Southeast Asia, the Allies looked to Central America as a new 
source for raw materials, such as rubber. By the 1960s, there had been enough 
capital investment to revitalise the long dormant fishing and lumbering 
industries.29 As the Somocistas came to dominate most economic sectors in the 
west, influence on the Coast was limited to a mere taxation of revenues. In 
essence, the Coast inhabitants enjoyed a substantial degree of self‑rule as 
well as cultural and religious independence, and as a result, few Costeños were 
inclined to dispute state policies. Indeed, some even chose employment within 
the Guardia Nacional.30
During the 1960s, the Pacific region of Nicaragua experienced dramatic 
increases in agro‑industrial production and manufacturing under the Somoza 
regime. As more land and property came on the west coast under the control of 
the Somocistas, the eastward migration of landless peasants vastly accelerated. 
Eventually, state interests necessitated colonisation of the largely under‑popu‑
lated Atlantic Coast to release demographic pressure. With the help of foreign 
aid granted by the United Nations and the Alliance for Progress, the regime 
expanded social services and economic development into the region for the first 
time. In addition to state‑enforced reforestation projects, new roads and bridges 
were constructed to link rural areas with larger population centres. However, 
in the wake of these internal improvements, Somoza assumed control of banana, 
sugarcane, and marine exports, adding them to his already extensive personal 
economic empire. Not unlike the multi‑national corporations that preceded, the 
revitalisation of the Coast economy was designed to serve the Somocistas rather 
than the Costeños.31 Even though the local population was presented with an 
27 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 43–46.
28 Charles R Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 118–119; Juan Mendez, The Miskitos in Nicara‑
gua, 1981–1984, (New York: Americas Watch Committee, 1984): 4.
29 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 51.
30 Bugajski, Sandinista Communism, 69.
31 Bermann, Big Stick, 7; Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 119–121.
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abundance of new opportunities for basic wage labour, Indian workers were often 
relegated to strenuous and low paying jobs. Furthermore, there was little chance 
of upward mobility. Somocista enterprises were the ones controlled by Mestizo 
capitalists who embraced the ideals of Hispanic culture. In this case, some Miski‑
tos and Creoles chose to distance themselves from their communities in an effort 
to rise within a dominant culture that held indigenous customs in contempt. 
Hence, if a Costeño hoped to achieve his aspirations, he must accept a “shift” 
in his ethnic identity.32
In the face of such uneven social and economic distribution in Nicaragua, the 
Catholic Church, fuelled by the renewed vigour of the Second Vatican Council 
and the Consejo Episcopal Latinamericano at Medellín, opted to dedicate its 
efforts toward improving the lot of Nicaragua’s poor.33 Catholic missionaries 
descended upon the Atlantic Coast to serve both the corporal and spiritual 
needs of the people. Moreover, a growing number of Christian laity within 
the region adopted a theology of human liberation in challenge to continued 
Indian subordination at the hands of the Mestizo majority.34 In 1973, Miskito 
members of the Moravian clergy organized the Alliance for Progress of Miskitos 
and Sumus (ALPROMISU) to represent the interests of indigenous peoples 
within the Somoza regime. The organization stressed Indian control over the 
land, resources, and political institutions of the Atlantic Coast by promoting 
social awareness among the local communities. Throughout the final years 
of the Somoza dynasty, members of ALPROMISU received both verbal and 
physical harassment at the hands of the Somocista elite. However, in the midst 
of the Sandinista‑inspired armed insurrection against the regime, the role of 
ALPROMISU and the Miskito population was decidedly passive.35
The Sandinista Revolution on the Atlantic Coast
The Sandinista were unable to overcome the Somocista after many attempts. 
Only a broad based coalition (FAO, Frente Amplio Opositor) of various 
organizations could withstand the onslaught of the Guardia Nacional. In which 
case, it was the pivotal role of the Catholic Church that allowed this coalition 
to form and succeed. Pope John XXIII set the theme of socio‑economic 
structural change through a series of encyclicals that included Mater et Magistra, 
again emphasising the rights of ownership and free association as a means of 
32 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 122–124.
33 CELAM, La Iglesia, 3–4; Wilson, “Church, State, and Society 120–122”.
34 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 125.
35 Dennis, “Costeños and Revolution,” 285–286; U.S. Department of State, Dispossessed, the 
Miskito Indians in Sandinista Nicaragua. (Washington DC: The United States Department of State, 
1986): 1–2.
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social and economic change.36 In Pacem im Terris, he gives clear definition 
of rights and duties of individuals, society, national states, and international 
relations, stressing the need for decent standards of living, education, and 
political participation.37 This theme was fully realised over the course of Vatican 
II, where the emphasis was placed on lay participation in the acquisition 
of equity and freedom. The social teachings of Vatican II were synthesised 
and further discussed by Pope Paul VI in the post‑Vatican‑II document, 
Populorum Progressio, including endemic poverty and injustice as well as 
the vast disparities of wealth and power supported by social, national, and 
international structures maintaining the status quo.38 Vatican II’s Apostolicam 
Actuositatem hoped to resolve these “immense inequalities” and advocate 
a “commitment to the poor” with a renewed call to Catholic Action.39 Both 
Vatican II’s Gaudium et Spes and Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio emphasised 
that the world and its goods are given to all mankind and that great disparities 
are not justified.40 Gaudium et Spes reaffirms the ancient teaching that “When 
a person is in extreme necessity he has the right to supply himself out of the 
riches of others”.41 Consequently, these very issues soon became the centre 
piece for an Episcopal Conference that would have an even greater impact on 
Nicaragua and the rest of Latin America.
In 1968, the Consejo Episcopal Latinamericano held their Second General 
Conference in Medellín, Columbia.42 This historic gathering of clergy had been 
assembled to address the issues brought up during Vatican II in a way that 
was relevant to the needs of Latin America. Dom Helder Camara, CELAM 
Secretary General, was a moving force sighting the need for transforming the 
current capitalist socio‑economic structures while avoiding Marxist options with 
its associated class warfare as “both systems militate against the dignity of the 
human person”.43 Camara pleaded for the development of grass‑root communities 
to form networks for a non‑violent confrontation with the prevailing unjust 
socio‑economic systems.44 At Medellín, the Church’s relationship to political 
authority was redefined to take on an offensive role in the remodeling of 
societal structures and display “a special commitment to the poor”. This new 
36 John XXIII, “Mater et Magistra: On Christian and Social Progress”. 15 May 1961, 4.
37 John XXIII, “Pacem in Terris: On Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity, and 
Liberty”. 11 April 1963, 2–5.
38 Vatican II, ‘Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World’, 2–4; 
Paul VI, “Populorum Progressio: On the Development of Peoples,” 26 March 1967, 1–4.
39 Vatican II, ‘Apostolicam Actuositatem: Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity’, 5–7.
40 Vatican II, ‘Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World’, 37–39. 
41 Ibidem, 39–40.
42 CELAM, La Iglesia en la Actual Transformacion de America Latina a la Luz del Concilio. 
CELAM: Bogotá.
43 Ibidem, 4.
44 Camara, Helder, Spiral of Violence. (London: Shed and Ward Ltd., 1971): 81–82.
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social doctrine encouraged the establishment of Comunidad Eclesial de Base 
(CEB or Christian Based Community) aimed at defending the rights of the 
impoverished masses and creating awareness of the social injustices, but more 
importantly, it encouraged a theology of human liberation based on analysis 
of class conflict that attempts to employ the gospel as a means of resolving 
concrete problems.45 
Vatican II had ushered in a greater concern for humanity, particularly the 
material conditions of the poor, the marginal, and the excluded. Liberation 
theology was created as a result of the existing doctrines and institutions 
failing to serve the real needs of the people. According to their chief author, 
Peruvian priest, Gustavo Gutiérrez, the key to analyzing the problem and 
creating a solution lay in the recognition of class struggle that is a part of 
current Latin America society and inherited from colonialism.46 Camara and 
Gutiérrez both struggled for an appropriate Christian response to this problem. 
Gutiérrez believed that only through social revolution could Latin America 
change its present condition.47 Such a revolution would have to be waged with 
religious symbols that made a clear distinction between the oppressor and 
the oppressed. In this sense, unjust social structures, such as capitalism and 
Western imperialism, became associated with sin. Perhaps the most elegant 
examples are found in the writings of the Trappest priest Fr. Ernesto Cardenal, 
who led the Marxist Christian community in Nicaragua.48 For example, poems 
of Marxist Christianity in Like the Waves (Cantiga 35) and The Grave of the 
Guerrilla (Cantiga 36), Christ could be interpreted as the ultimate political 
figure and revolutionary. Cardenal made use of traditional Christian imagery 
with the “New Jerusalem” replaced by the “New Havana” described in Cantiga 
19.49 According to Gutiérrez, there could be no neutrality; one had to take 
up the “option of the poor” and be committed to Marxist revolution in order 
to be a Christian.50 While there is some convergence of Marxist and traditional 
Christian ideals, they differ on the roles of private property, democracy, human 
solidarity, and especially revolutionary violence. 
The Sandinista Revolution was mainly organized among western Spanish 
Mestizos against the Somoza regime and was met with little enthusiasm on 
behalf of the indigenous inhabitants of the Atlantic Coast. With the exception 
of a few radical student groups, virtually no Costeños actively participated in 
the overthrow of Somoza. Although the Indian and Creole communities had 
45 Ibidem, 37–39.
46 Gutiérrez, Gustavo (1973) “A Theology of Liberation,” (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 
1973): 137.
47 Ibidem, 48, 53–58.
48 Cardenal, Ernesto (1993) Cosmic Canticle. (Willianic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1993): 351–378.
49 Ibidem, 191.
50 Gutiérrez, “A Theology of Liberation,”108–109, 137–140.
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experienced a sharp demotion in the social and cultural status in the wake 
of a recently established Mestizo majority, these indigenous minorities had 
found the presence of the Somocistas on the Coast to be relatively unintrusive 
in relation to their customs and way of life.51 Moreover, Somocista industries had 
provided them with extra income to complement their efforts at subsistence 
farming and the opportunity to purchase foreign manufactured goods. The 
victorious Frente Sandinista Liberación Nacional (FSLN), on the other hand, 
regarded the Costneños’ self‑determination and capitalist sensibilities as 
politically ignorant and ideologically regressive to the revolutionary process. 
Furthermore, early concerns for “Nicaragua’s territorial unity was one 
dimension of the national unity strategy, a pillar of the Sandinista program”.52 
The Sandinistas immediately seized control of the remaining foreign and 
Somocista enterprises, effectively ending the enclave economy with its 
well‑stocked company stores on the Coast.53 Henceforth, the new regime 
would seek to reverse the effects of over a century of “imperialist exploitation” 
by redirecting “subsistence patterns, political structures, and class relations 
toward socialist development”.54
The Sandinistas, however, in their overzealous attempt to eliminate racist 
and ethnocentric patterns, would fail to recognize distinctive social formations 
(communal lands, English in education and administration, capitalism, 
Protestantism, and specific Indian cultural factors) in their application of 
political organization and symbolism to the Atlantic Coast. For example, the 
literacy campaign was dominated by western Mestizo students from high schools 
and universities with very little training to implement this “political project with 
pedagogical implementations”.55 The state initiated a massive cultural assistance 
program aimed at strengthening ethnic identities and preserving communal 
lands. Subsistence farmers were organized into agrarian cooperatives in an 
effort to maximize production for the entire region. Lands not under immediate 
cultivation or lacking proper titles were converted into state farms.56 Basic 
commodities were sold directly to the state at fixed prices (an onerous practice 
not unlike price‑fixing under the Somocista),57 and the state in turn provided 
access to consumers through local commissaries. Having the advantage of 
a common language and culture, the Mestizo population was able to more fully 
participate in government programs and, therefore, receive a greater share of the 
51 Bugajski, Sandinista Communism, 69–70.
52 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 107.
53 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 129; Wilson, “Regional Confluence”.
54 Bugajski, Sandinista Communism, 72.
55 Sheryl Hirshon, And Also Teach Them to Read. (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & CO., 
1983): 3,7.
56 Bugajski, Sandinista Communism. 81.
57 Hirshon, And Also Teach Them to Read. 141–143.
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benefits.58 The Miskitos, with their own culture and language, came to resent state 
initiatives that often excluded ethnic minorities from national life. At the onset of 
the Sandinista literacy campaign, the Indian communities were held back by the 
Spanish curriculum. Moreover, when encouraged to join mass organizations in an 
attempt to further their proletarian rights, the Miskitos increasingly encountered 
a commercial and economic infrastructure dominated by Spanish‑speaking 
Mestizos from the Pacific region. The Sandinistas with attitudes of arrogant 
certitude having grown in Hispanic culture of the west coast had no previous 
experience in dealing with ethnic minorities with their distinctive language 
and cultural assumptions.59 Therefore, when policies fell short of expectations, 
the Miskito population would mobilize against what they perceived as an 
unwanted intrusion.60
Although the Sandinistas seemed to voice concern about the plight of Ni ‑
caragua’s indigenous population, the National Directorate was intent upon 
subjugating any independent source of authority or organization. This was likewise 
true in the subjugation of the Catholic Church by the Sandinistas.61 As Miskito 
activists began to press the new government to renew their political autonomy, 
the FSLN grew increasingly suspicious of their motivations. The Sandinistas were 
only too aware of Miskito ties to the Somocistas and North American capitalists 
and deemed their separatist demands as counter‑revolutionary. As a result, several 
branches of the Sandinista Defence Committee (CDS) began to arrive to the 
Coast to subsequently replace the existing Miskito and Moravian institutions.62 
Hence, to fully consolidate the Atlantic Coast under centralised control, the state 
found it necessary to further subordinate the independence aspirations of the 
indigenous communities.
In the face of increasing agitation within the indigenous population, FSLN 
leader, Daniel Ortega, agreed to meet with representatives of 185 indigenous 
communities during ALPROMISU’s fifth annual congress, 8–11 November 1979, 
to consider grievances brought to the attention of the Sandinista government. 
During the course of the delegation, Ortega contended that the needs and 
interests of the Costeños could best be served within the existing Farm Workers’ 
Association (Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo, ATC). Miskito leaders, 
on the other hand, insisted on the formation of a new grassroots organization 
headed by those who it aimed to represent (non‑Hispanic minorities). In the 
end, Ortega consented to the creation of Miskito, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista 
Unity (MISURASATA) and awarded it a seat on the newly formed Council of 
58 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 129–131.
59 Ibidem, 12.
60 Mendez, The Miskitos, 5; Bugajski, Sandinista Communism, 77.
61 Wilson, “Church, State and Society,” 128.
62 Bugajski, Sandinista Communism, 75; Nietschmann, Unknown War, 26.
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State, but even though MISURASATA would participate in the implementation 
of government programs, the Sandinista cadre remained distrustful of its 
leadership.63 Membership would be comprised of largely Moravian religious and 
student activists who served to empower the Miskito people. As the organization 
received wide support from the Miskito community, it became increasingly 
aggressive, confronting the state on issues ranging from worker wages to resource 
jurisdiction. MISURASATA proved to be an effective instrument in promoting the 
interests of the indigenous population, subsequently compelling the Sandinistas 
to pass a variety of pro‑indigenous legislation that included a bilingual education 
law and an increase of land titling to Indian communities.64
Although the government reluctantly conceded to a great number of Miskito 
demands, social unrest soon spread to other sections of the indigenous population. 
Creoles began to demonstrate in the streets of Bluefields against the lack of 
government consideration for their political interests. Furthermore, the Creole 
community was opposed to the Sandinistas invitation of Cuban educators 
and physicians to the Atlantic Coast due to their underlying Communist 
agenda. By 1980, members of this disaffected population had organized into 
the Southern Indigenous Creole Community (SICC) despite the government’s 
refusal to officially recognise it. Therefore, in response to the state’s seeming 
indifference, the Creole population remained generally apathetic toward the 
revolutionary process.65
Despite government efforts to improve living conditions on the Coast, the 
Miskito population could still recall better times in recent memory. The Costeños 
longed for the days when hard currency and foreign manufactured goods 
circulated through the villages and the state allowed them to determine their 
own destiny. As months past, the Miskitos came to regard the Sandinistas’ 
anti‑capitalist rhetoric and socialist organization as a direct threat to their 
continued way of life. In August 1980, the Nicaraguan Institute for National 
Resources and the Environment (IRENA) authorised the seizure of  9000 square 
kilometres of virgin forest as a national reserve. Subsequently, the state 
allowed the reserve to overlap into territory claimed by a Miskito community 
due the lack of a proper title. The leaders of MISURASATA were convinced 
that this was the first step by the state to ultimately nationalise all natural 
63 Barricada Staff, “Together We Will Build A Just Society!,” in National Revolution and In‑
digenous Identity: The Conflict Between Sandinists and Miskito Indians on Nicaragua’s Atlantic 
Coast, ed. Klaudine Ohland and Robin Schneider (Copenhagen: International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs, Document no. 47, November 1983): 38–40; Brown, “Miskito Revindica‑
tion,” 181.
64 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 133–135; Nietschmann, Unknown War, 28.
65 Phillipe Bourgois, “Ethnic Minorities,” in Nicaragua: The First Five Years, (201–216) ed. 
Thomas W. Walker (New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1985): 203; Dennis, “Costeños and 
Revolution,” 290.
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resources on the Atlantic Coast.66 As a result of the incident, certain elements 
within the Miskito organisation opted for greater militancy in confronting 
the government.
Steadman Fagoth Müeller had emerged as a prominent leader within 
MISURASATA due to his outspoken criticism of Sandinista policies. As the 
Miskito representative within the Council of State, he had been a proponent for 
regional self‑determination and labour pluralism on behalf of Costeño youth and 
women.67 In response to the recent wave of government expropriations, Fagoth 
demanded “territorial rights encompassing nearly one‑third of Nicaragua’s 
territory, political independence, five additional seats within the Council, 
and even a seat within the governing junta”.68 The Sandinista government had 
arrested Fagoth, having allegedly uncovered his ties to the Somocistas as a former 
intelligence agent. Outraged by this action, members of MISURASATA met at 
a Moravian church in Prinzepolka in February 1981 to discuss the next course 
of action. Shortly after their arrival, Sandinista soldiers came to make arrests. 
A violent confrontation ensued, resulting in the death of four soldiers and four 
Miskito civilians. In the end, 33 MISURASATA leaders were rounded up on 
charges of separatism. News spread quickly across the Atlantic Coast prompting 
nearly 2,000 Costeños to hold a two month vigil for their release. Bowing to public 
pressure, the FSLN released Fagoth and the others in May. Nevertheless, blood 
had been spilled, and  MISURASATA expected severe retaliation on the part of the 
Sandinistas. As a result, Fagoth and 3,000 other Miskitos were compelled to flee 
to Honduras in hopes of meeting up with the infant Nicaraguan Democratic 
Force (Fuerza Democrática Nicuaragüense, FDN).69
The policies of President Jimmy Carter had facilitated the success of the 
Sandinista Revolution by implementing an effective arms embargo;70 and 
the  1980 Carter budget had provided $75 million to the FSLN. With the fall 
of the Somoza government, soldiers of the former Guardia Nacional began 
operating in Nicaragua’s frontier provinces as a counter‑revolutionary guerrilla 
force (Contras) using bases in Honduras. This Nicaraguan Democratic Force 
66 Brown, “Miskito Revindication,” 181; Barricada Staff, “Agreement on Norms For Lum‑
ber‑Felling” (14 February 1981) in National Revolution and Indigenous Identity: The Conflict 
 Between Sandinists and Miskito Indians on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast ed. Klaudine Ohland and 
Robin Schneider, (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Document no. 
47, November 1983): 95–105.
67 Bugajski, Sandinista Communism, 75.
68 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 135.
69 Patria Libre Staff, “Counter‑revolutionary Plan Subdued in the Atlantic Coast,” Patria 
Libre, no. 11. February 1981, in National Revolution and Indigenous Identity: The Conflict Between 
Sandinists and Miskito Indians on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast ed. Klaudine Ohland and Robin 
Schneider (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Document no. 47, 
November 1983): 99–105; Brown, Miskito Revindication, 182.
70 Anastasio Somoza, Nicaragua Betrayed. (Boston: Western Island Publishers, 1980), 239–240).
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would become a focus of U.S. policy; and its proximity to the Miskito homelands 
would become an important factor in the struggle to re‑establish autonomy.71 
Interestingly, it has been suggested that the Carter Administration had planned 
to engage the Miskito against the FSLN even before the July 1979 revolutionary 
victory had taken place.72 At the start of the Reagan administration, the FDN 
began receiving weapons and training from the CIA to destabilise the Sandinista 
government. Fagoth and his Miskito followers established an alliance with these 
Contras in hopes of securing a semi‑autonomous region under U.S. arms.73 
In October 1981, armed Miskitos, under Fagoth’s leadership, began making 
incursions onto the Atlantic Coast in an attempt to inspire a Miskito uprising 
against the Sandinistas. As the Sandinista army retaliated against these activities, 
thousands of Costeños were forced to flee to Honduras and Costa Rica to escape 
the incurring violence. Oftentimes, however, these refugees found themselves 
caught between the opposing combatants.74
Forced Relocation: The Catalyst for Miskito Mobilization
As the conflict escalated, the Sandinistas became increasingly concerned 
over civilian collaboration with the Miskito insurgents. Sympathetic villages 
often provided the guerrillas with safe havens as well as sources for supplies 
and recruitment. The FSLN feared that these activities might be pre‑emptive 
of a full‑scale U.S. invasion against the regime. Therefore, the government 
found it necessary to relocate certain Coast communities that might offer 
assistance  to the counter‑revolutionaries.75 In January 1982, the Sandinistas 
began forcibly evacuating inhabitants from 65 communities along the Rio Coco 
near the Honduran border. Within two months, over 8,500 Miskitos had been 
evicted from their homes and moved by truck, bus, and even on foot across 
rugged terrain to a number of resettlement areas located far away from any armed 
activity. Members of these communities had been given only a few hours notice 
of their predicament and had been allowed to retain only a few essentials 
71 Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, Indians of the Americas Human Rights and Self‑Determination. (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1984): 247–249.
72 Ibidem, 247.
73 Charles R. Hale, “Institutional Struggle, Conflict and Reconciliation: Miskitu Indians and 
the Nicaraguan State (1979–1985),” in Ethnic Groups and The Nation State: The Case of the Atlantic 
Coast in Nicaragua (CIDCA/Development Study Unit, Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 
Department of Social Anthropology, 1987): 111–112.
74 Brown, “Miskito Revindication,” 184; Nietschmann, Unknown War, 33–34; Ortiz, Indians of 
the Americas, 249.
75 Brown, “Miskito Revindication,” 185; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB, The 
Inside Story. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990): 599.
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in their possession. The villages, crops, farm animals and all else left behind 
were then subsequently destroyed so as to deny the insurgents anything of 
value.76 It has been alleged that over 300 Miskitos had been killed during the 
evacuations. However, one thing that remained certain was the fact that another 
10,000 Costeños had chosen to flee to Honduras rather than become captives of 
the Sandinista government.77
The vast majority of the displaced Río Coco inhabitants were placed 
in a series of resettlement camps known collectively as Tasba Pri or “free land,” 
located some 50 miles south of the river. For the most part, the camps provided 
adequate food, health care, and even schools for the large number of Miskito 
residents. Yet, by the same token, they often lacked the amenities to which 
the Miskitos had grown accustomed.78 For one thing, the camps were unable 
to provide sufficient housing to most camp residents. Inhabitants were forced 
to reside in long communal tents known as champas that consisted of elevated 
wooden floors, open sides, and a plastic roof. Most often, entire families were 
grouped together in these narrow dwellings creating cramped conditions 
with little privacy. Likewise, there were few work opportunities available 
for residents beyond collective agriculture and intermittent construction. 
Traditional Miskito pastimes such as hunting and fishing were seriously 
curtailed due to restrictions on movement outside of the resettlement areas. 
As a result, unoccupied adult males were often subject to being drafted into 
the Sandinista defence forces.79 
In the months following the Río Coco evacuations, the flight of Miskito refugees 
into Honduras had helped to swell the ranks of the armed insurgents operating on 
the Atlantic Coast. With training and a limited supply of second‑hand weapons, 
many able‑bodied males had volunteered to infiltrate back into Nicaragua to join 
the guerrillas in their struggle against government forces. In response to these 
incursions, the Sandinistas decided to relocate an additional 18,000 Miskitos 
from 49 communities in Northern Zelaya.80 However, the process that had once 
been described by the FSLN leadership as a “peaceful, orderly, and uneventful 
affair,” soon elapsed into a violent and chaotic scene in which Sandinista soldiers 
increasingly took out their hostilities upon helpless civilians.81
76 Mendez, The Miskitos, 15–16; Ortiz, 252.
77 Mendez, The Miskitos, 17; Nietschmann, Unknown War, 34.
78 Brown, “Miskito Revindication,” 186; Mendez, The Miskitos, 18.
79 Mendez, The Miskitos, 19–23.
80 Bugajski, Sandinista Communism, 95; Nietschmann, Unknown War, 39.
81 Inter‑American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights of 
a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin and Resolution on the Friendly Settlement 
Procedure Regarding the Human Rights Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of 
Miskito Origin. (Washington DC: General Secretariat, Organization of American States, 1984): 83.
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Poor military command over government troops had contributed to abductions, 
rapes, and other reprehensible behaviours. Likewise, logistical problems associated 
with resettling a large population resulted in a number of unnecessary tragedies. 
One such incident involving an overloaded helicopter ended in the deaths of 75 
children who were being transported to an internment camp.82 To make matters 
worse, the Sandinista government decided to declare a state of emergency in July 
1982, further restricting civil liberties and special programs on the Coast so as 
to isolate the guerrillas from the civilian population. During this latest effort to curb 
the spread of counter‑revolutionary activity, Sandinista soldiers often failed to dif‑
ferentiate the conscientious objector from the armed insurgent. Suspected collabo‑
rators were rounded up on the slightest pretence, thereby subjecting entire villages 
to extreme levels of physical harassment.83 By targeting Miskito communities, the 
Sandinistas had hoped to deprive the armed resistance of valuable sources of sup‑
plies and recruitment, but as a result of martial law and continued relocations, the 
civilian population had been pushed ever further into the armed camp. 
The new oppression perpetrated not only on the Atlantic Coast but also 
in the Pacific region by the National Directorate soon led to cracks in Sandinista 
solidarity, with the hero of the revolution, Edén Pastora, leaving Nicaragua 
with his Southern Sandinista Army to take up opposition in Costa Rica. His 
explanation of these actions in a 15 April 1982 press release stated the following: 
“With sorrow I have seen that intranquility (sic) reigns among my people, also 
anguish, fear, bitter frustration, personal insecurity. Our Miskito, Sumu, and 
Rama Indians are persecuted, jailed, or assassinated. And the press and radio 
are unable to denounce to the world this regime of terror that the feared State 
Security creates on the Atlantic Coast and in all of Nicaragua”.84 
By August 1982, the situation on the Atlantic Coast had deteriorated to such an 
extent that a diplomatic solution no longer seemed possible. With the remaining 
MISURASATA leaders either having been imprisoned or forced to flee the country, 
the Indian leadership reluctantly conceded their authority to Steadman Fagoth 
Müeller who had long professed the need for a “holy war” against Sandinista 
forces. As a final break with its Sandinista foundations, Fagoth had MISURASATA 
formally dissolved in order to form a new organization that would become more 
closely aligned with the Contras (FDN). Upon its inception, MISURA (Miskitos, 
Sumus, Ramas) would operate as an independent branch of the FDN, in an effort 
to recapture villages and disrupt government communications and supply lines.85
82 Inter‑American Commission on Human Rights, Report on, 83–84; Mendez, The Miskitos, 41.
83 Brown, “Miskito Revindication,” 187–188; Bourgois, “Ethnic Minorities,” 204–205.
84 Edén Pastora, 15 April 1982 Press Release from San José, Costa Rica, trans. Shirley Christian, 
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As a result of the relocation process and the subsequent armed conflict, 
approximately 70,000 Costeños had been displaced since 1982. Whereas 20,000 had 
been subject to internment in the resettlement camps, another 50,000 had been 
forced to flee to Costa Rica and Honduras where as many as 10,000 had joined 
the armed resistance.86 Similarly, of the 400 Miskitos that had been incarcerated 
as political prisoners, 250 had been executed for counter‑revolutionary 
activities. In addition, the communities that had remained intact had suffered 
from famine and other hardships associated with government restrictions 
placed upon movements beyond the vicinity of villages. However, as pressure 
continued to mount on multiple fronts, the Sandinistas found it necessary 
to redress a number of these “past errors” to quell some of the opposition 
to the regime.87 Initially, this new policy manifested in the partial release of 
civilians and political prisoners from their confinement. Furthermore, the 
FSLN offered amnesty to insurgents who were willing to lay down their arms 
and return to Nicaragua. But even though hundreds of Indian guerrillas 
accepted the offer and returned to their families, the government still had not 
voiced any consideration for indigenous demands, nor had it compensated for 
the pain and suffering inflicted upon Coast inhabitants. In consequence, the 
fighting continued until the Sandinistas gave serious considerations toward 
the issue of regional autonomy.88
With an open counter‑revolution occurring on two additional fronts, it was 
becoming increasingly evident by 1983 that Sandinista policies on the Atlantic 
Coast had failed and a new course of action was required. Although there 
had been some redirection of the literacy campaign by offering instruction 
in native languages a few years earlier, the main apparatus of government 
remained firmly in Sandinista hands.89 In early December 1983, amnesty was 
given to 300 jailed Costeños for their opposition to Sandinista rule and an 
additional 900 Costeños were pardoned in 1984.90 These actions were followed 
by a reduction in the number of outside Mestizo civil servants being replaced 
by local Costeños. The healing process was accelerated by the establishment of 
Peace and Autonomy Commissions (PAC) formed directly with local Costeños 
(including many religious leaders) with locally elected representatives 
to promote peace, repatriation, and reconstruction of the villages. By 1987, 
120 PACs were in operation among the Rio Coco villages and over 20,000 
Miskitos had been repatriated.91 An Autonomy Law for the Atlantic Coast was 
passed in September 1987 by the National Assembly, giving the Miskito of 
86 Nietschmann, Unknown War, 43.
87 U. S. Department of State, Dispossessed, 4–5.
88 Brown, “Miskito Revindication,” 191–193.
89 Ortiz, Indians in the Americas, 243.
90 Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity,155.
91 Ibidem, 165.
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the region rights to local water, land, and woods traditionally held by the local 
communities whose peoples, once again, have the right to the produce from such 
areas as well as to form their own social organisations.92 
Conclusion
The Costeños regarded the Sandinista programs of cultural assistance and 
social reconstruction as yet another ill‑conceived attempt by the Nicaraguan 
government to Hispanicise the region. Nevertheless, as time went on, the 
Coast inhabitants soon recognised the potential for serious disruption 
of well‑established social and economic patterns and, therefore, found it 
necessary to resist efforts that threatened to destroy their historical traditions 
and continued way of life.
The forced migration of large numbers of Miskitos under less than ideal 
conditions helped to accelerate the already massive defections into Honduras and 
Costa Rica. In addition, the increasing dislocation of indigenous groups served 
to transform attitudes of political indifference into more pronounced displays 
of armed resistance. Ultimately, the ensuing armed conflict between Sandinista 
forces and Miskito guerrillas would resolve the long‑standing ideological dispute 
on the Atlantic Coast. Therefore, since passive resistance had failed to bring 
about political change, military insurgency became the decisive instrument of 
negotiation in gaining their rights. 
John‑Paul Wilson
Forced Relocation: Catalyst for Indigenous Resistance on Nicaragua’s 
Atlantic Coast, 1980–1990
Summary
Over the course of this paper, the author carefully illustrates how Sandinista programs 
of cultural assistance and social reconstruction that were intended to benefit the peoples of 
Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast actually served to alienate large segments of the indigenous 
population. Likewise, he shows how the apparent ignorance of the Frente Sandinista 
Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in regard to their understanding of indigenous social and 
political formations produced high levels of indifference among the Coast communities 
toward the revolutionary process. As a result, he demonstrates how increasingly 
repressive responses on the part of the Sandinista government toward popular dissension 
helped to transform the fundamental character of the indigenous opposition from one of 
political apathy to that of armed resistance. However, to reach such valid conclusions, the 
92 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 231; Vilas, State, Class and Ethnicity, 175.
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author first retraces the origins and evolution of the Miskito, Sumu, Rama, and Creole 
peoples within the context of their continuing struggle against the Nicaraguan state 
to maintain their own separate cultural and ethnic identities. In addition, he discusses 
the arrival of the Sandinistas on the Atlantic Coast and how their social and political 
interaction with  the Costeños precipitated hostilities. Finally, the author examines the 
Sandinista decision to forcibly relocate large numbers of Miskito civilians and how it 
related to subsequent indigenous emigration and the emergence of an armed conflict.
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